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Abstract

The way we interact with the world is governed by a body of rules, many of which are unspoken.
What makes these rules so compelling? How do they interact with our decision-making
infrastructure? In a series of three studies, this article explores the shared adaptive sampling
model’s ability to account for normative behaviors, using a time pressure paradigm in which
subjects (N = 399) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk quickly judged whether actions of
various degrees of moral permissibility and social acceptability were possible or impossible in a
certain context (Phillips & Cushman, 2017; Phillips, Morris, & Cushman, 2019). When making
intuitive judgements of possibility, participants regarded immoral actions as physically
impossible, replicating findings from previous research (Phillips & Cushman, 2017). This effect
was not found for actions that are simply abnormal, violating social norms rather than moral
norms. These studies also provide evidence to suggest that beyond subjects’ assessments of
moral permissibility or impermissibility, it is the general perceived value (good vs. bad) of the
proposed actions that drives the morality deliberation effect. This is consistent with a two-staged
decision-making process, as described in the shared adaptive sampling model, in which the mind
samples generally good and generally likely possibilities before using contextual information to
further select amongst them. Overall, these studies elucidate the similarities and differences
between various normative judgements and general assessments of value and probability,
corroborating the shared adaptive sampling model, providing reason to believe that moral norms
are distinct from social norms, and offering insight into how various sorts of norms may interact
with possibility sampling and decision-making.
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Why do we follow rules? An exploration of normativity and possibility
Introduction
Human societies are governed by rules that facilitate the smooth functioning of groups,
small and large. Some rules, like “don’t kill people,” have clear moral valences while others, like
“don’t cut in line,” are less obviously right or wrong; some rules, like “don’t speed on the
highway, are codified in law while others, like “don’t hug strangers,” are unspoken
understandings. Rules, even arbitrary and implicit rules, are as ubiquitous as they are vital to the
daily functioning of organizations and societies. Generally speaking, we eat with silverware,
wash our hands, are silent in class, walk on the right side of the sidewalk, and show up to
meetings. On a large scale, this level of cooperation is clearly beneficial. However, these rules
are meaningless unless a critical mass chooses to follow them, and in any given moment,
following a rule may involve incurring a personal cost for the benefit of another person or for the
benefit of society more broadly. So, why is it that people follow rules?
This article reviews the literature on cooperative and normative behavior and relates
existing theories to a unifying decision-making framework: the shared-adaptive sampling model,
first proposed by (Phillips, Morris, & Cushman, 2019). Next, a series of three studies examines
the shared adaptive sampling model and the extent to which it can account for intuitive rulefollowing behavior. Also discussed are the ways in which different categories of norms come
into play at different points in the decision-making process.
Review of literature on human cooperation
Existing theories, and the research that backs them, seem to coalesce in general
agreement around the proposition that cooperation is advantageous and that some sort of
enforcement structure maintains the necessary levels of cooperative behavior (Alvard, 2013;
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Baumard et al., 2013; Declerck et al., 2013, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Gürerk et al., 2006;
Martin et al., 2019; Rand, 2013; Rand et al., 2014; & Tomasello, 2019). These theories are
broadly similar, though they take different positions on the question of how widespread human
cooperation came to be.
Reciprocity and social punishment
By some accounts, it is internal incentives, arising over the course of evolution, that make
mutual cooperation intrinsically rewarding (Baumard et al., 2013; Declerck et al., 2013). The
condition of mutuality — or “reciprocity,” as it is described in game theory — is an important
caveat (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, Rand, 2013). Brain imaging and self-report measures indicate
that people find reciprocated cooperation “personally satisfying,” even when free-riding would
be more personally advantageous (Kalish, 1998, p. 99).
This intrinsic valuing of reciprocity was solidified over the course of evolution as people
learned how to avoid social punishments associated with violating reciprocity norms. Baumard et
al. (2013) hold that moral systems are in essence an unspoken social contract enforced by “the
risk of not being chosen as partners in future transactions” (p. 62). Within a reciprocity
framework, ““free-riding” may turn out anything but free” (Baumard 2013, p. 66), while
cooperation is likely to be reciprocated in the future (Declerck et al. 2013; Baumard et al. 2013).
Corrective punishments — whether they take the form of refusal to associate in future
interactions or more explicit sanctions — function as a sort of “negative distribution” to restore
fairness (Baumard et al. 2013). People punish even when they are a third party who receives no
direct benefit from punishing and even when punishing is costly at a personal level (Declerck et
al. 2013), though the likelihood of punishment decreases as associated costs increase (Baumard
et al. 2013). These “altruistic” acts of punishment are associated with activity in brain areas
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typically involved with the reward system, leading some to conclude that punishment is
intrinsically rewarding (Declerck et al. 2013; Baumard et al. 2013). In the context of a web of
interpersonal relations, direct reciprocity may be enough to account for the evolutionary rise of
human cooperation at the macro level (Rand, 2013; Baumard et al., 2013).
Social expectations and group membership
Others maintain that an intrinsic valuing of reciprocity is not sufficient to maintain
cooperation without additional enforcement from the external positive and negative incentives
associated with group membership (Alvard, 2013; Declerck et al., 2013; & Tomasello 2019).
People may cooperate because of the benefits — including stability, access to resources,
belongingness, and social status — that naturally follow from group membership (Alvard, 2013;
Declerck et al., 2013; Tomasello, 2019). They may also be motivated by the threat of punishment
or sanctions, choosing to follow rules because they fear that fellow in-group members will
enforce those rules in the case of a violation (Baumard et al., 2013; Fehr & Fichbacher, 2004;
Rand, 2013; Tomasello, 2019).
Cooperation or defection in the context of one interaction may affect actors’ reputations
in a way that carries implications for future interactions (Baumard et al., 2013; Fehr &
Fichbacher, 2004; Rand, 2013; Tomasello, 2019). People incorporate indirectly-observed
interactions in their evaluations of others. For example, if X person slights Y person, and you
observe this, you will be less willing to engage with X person in the future. This tendency is
present early in development, with infants as young as 5 months old demonstrating preference
for actors that display pro-social behaviors (Hamlin et al., 2011). The flip side of this is indirect
reciprocity, which describes instances in which people cooperate with the expectation that others
will hear of, and in turn reciprocate, their generosity (Rand, 2013).
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Even if an actor is not personally involved in a dispute, their response, or lack thereof,
can have a lasting effect on their reputation. Third-party punishment of defection “signal[s]
prosociality and trustworthiness [and] a willingness to retaliate when harmed directly” (Martin et
al., 2019, p. 11), further reinforcing expectations of cooperation (Fischbacher, 2004). To return
to our earlier example, if X person slights Y person, and Z person doesn’t condemn X’s actions,
and you observe this, you will be less likely to engage with Z in the future. In other words, it is
expected that group members will practice, require, and enforce cooperation, even for
interactions in which they are not directly involved.
Pro-social norms and conformity
When viewed in the context of increasingly higher-order cooperative behaviors, these
‘expectations’ begin to resemble social norms, which govern the rules under which agents
affiliated with a particular group operate. Some argue that it is conformity to norms, rather than
reciprocity, which explains the widespread nature of cooperation (Gürerk et al., 2006; Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004). Norms may be voluntarily obeyed if there is an alignment in incentives —
Tomasello (2019) describes a joint “we” agent that is essentially an embodiment of value
alignment.
A “we” implies a sense of belongingness. In following a rule, we do more than uphold
social order — we choose a team. In experimental settings, following a single arbitrary rule has
been enough to guarantee belongingness in a social group (Dunham, 2018). As evolutionary
advances led to societies so large that one couldn’t possibly know everyone, conformity to this
joint “we” agent would have been an important means of signaling trustworthiness (Tomasello,
2019). In this way, normative behavior constructs and enforces social identities: conforming to a
norm is a means of actively identifying with a group (Brennan et al., 2013).
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A clarifying example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. To clarify the differences between
these different, though not entirely incompatible, theories, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see
Figure 1). From each players’ perspective, the dominant strategy is defection; however, from a
societal (collective) perspective, the dominant strategy is cooperation, as it results in a greater
joint payoff.
Figure 1

Player 1

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Defect
Cooperate

Player 2
Defect
(4, 4)
(0, 12)

Cooperate
(12, 0)
(7, 7)

What drives players to cooperate? The coordinating device at play may be an intrinsic
valuing of mutual cooperation, providing additional individual incentive to cooperate even when
the dominant strategy is defection and allowing partners to assume that their counterparts will
also cooperate. Cooperation may also be attributable to external factors not captured by the
individual payoff matrix — such as social affiliation, punishment, or reputational damage — and
it may be these extrinsic incentives that push players to cooperate. Or, perhaps, in cases of joint
agenthood, players respond to collective, not individual, payoffs. Finally, it could be the case that
the specific actions under consideration (cooperate versus defect) are not particularly relevant,
and it is the conformity to some external norm (in this case cooperation) that both players value.
If we take a step back and examine these theories’ commonalities, we see that they each
involve assigning value to actions. Behaviors are evaluated as valuable (they have historically
positive social implications, they activate the reward pathway, etc.) or harmful (they have
historically negative social implications, they cause personal discomfort, etc.). Some theories
hold that this evaluation happens early in the decision-making process, at an intuitive level, and
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other theories hold that this evaluation happens only as potential actions are explicitly
considered. This article considers a broader, simpler model of rule-following behavior that
describes how various means of assigning value to actions work in unison to inform decisionmaking.
Shared adaptive sampling model
First, consider that following a rule involves a deliberate choice. Making a deliberate
choice requires two mental states: (1) the conceptualizing and entertaining of feasible
possibilities and (2) selection amongst those possibilities (Byrne, 2007). Thus, in choosing to
follow a rule, humans implicitly and explicitly consider and evaluate possible actions. Phillips,
Morris, & Cushman (2019) outline a model that describes the means by which people reason
across possibilities.
Their shared adaptive sampling model holds that the mind samples the space of possible
actions within a task-specific partition, prioritizing possibilities with a high general cached value.
The cached value is informed by past experience and learning, and it reflects historical value and
probability of occurrence. More prevalent possibilities, or possibilities that the actor has
encountered with greater frequency, would have a greater cached value, as would possibilities
that the actor considers to be high-utility. In this first stage, possibilities are represented in a
course-grain fashion. In the next stage, the brain selects amongst the adaptively sampled
possibilities, ranking them according to context-specific value. A possibility may be generally
valuable and common, but less advantageous given current circumstances. For example,
someone may generally like eating soup, but not when it is hot outside. This latter stage involves
finer-grain, context-specific representations that are accurate yet computationally expensive.
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The shared adaptive sampling model is well-positioned to account for rule-following
behavior. Rule-following is normative: rules are upheld by a critical mass of people that follow
them, and any given actor’s past experience with rules is likely largely characterized by
compliance. Additionally — as was described in the earlier discussion of the positive and
negative extrinsic and intrinsic incentive structures surrounding normative cooperation — rulefollowing is valuable. Rules maintain social cohesion. Following a rule can be an affiliative
gesture, securing stability and belongingness, and it can be rewarding in of itself. Be it through
direct experience, second-hand exposure, or internal conviction, we know that violating a rule is
of low value, while following a rule is of high value.
Given that historical value and probability of occurrence receive priority in the formation
of consideration sets, and assuming that rule violations are typically stored as low-probability
and low-value options, it would follow that we consider rule-following possibilities to a greater
degree than rule-violating possibilities. The priority received by representation of high-value,
high-probability possible actions would be visible in actions taken, as we ultimately choose from
the pool of possibilities represented in our consideration set (Hauser, 2014). In other words, we
may follow a given rule simply because the high-value and high-probability nature of rulefollowing behaviors makes it easier to conceptualize them as possibilities.
Example: A dining hall
Say, for example, you are filling your plate at a buffet-style dining hall. You could start a
food fight. You could make a salad at the salad bar, using any of the hundreds of permutations of
ingredient combinations. You could wait in line for a slice of pizza. You could serve yourself
chicken using tongs. You could serve yourself chicken using your hands. You could serve
yourself chicken using your mouth. You could take a bite of your meal. You could rub your meal
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in a stranger’s face. You could eat at a table. You could eat seated on the floor. You could do
yoga on a table. The array of possibly possible actions before you is mind-bogglingly expansive,
though some of them are clearly more valuable and more common than others. The shared
adaptive sampling model would hold that as you stand before the dining hall offerings, the
possible courses of action that come to mind (that is, the adaptively-sampled initial consideration
set) would be those that are high-value and high-probability.
Establishing the value of actions is an iterative process. Some may be intrinsically
valuable — perhaps conformity, perhaps cooperation — while others may be learned. With
experience, trial, and error, we update the relevant general cached value. For example, seeing a
restaurant full of people eating at tables, rather than on the floor, reinforces this action’s
characterization as high-probability. Lack of success in attempts to serve yourself chicken with
your mouth reinforces this action’s characterization as low-value. In general, actions that comply
with established rules and social norms are more likely to be high-value and high-probability; for
example: waiting in line, serving yourself with utensils, eating at a table, etc.
This updating process, and the guiding effect it has on future behavior, is reminiscent of
the Social Heuristic Hypothesis, which attributes normative cooperation to the internalization
and generalization of learned social norms (Rand et al., 2014). It maintains that we intuitively
apply historically-valuable norms like cooperation to novel situations, even when cooperation is
not clearly advantageous, as is the case in artificial lab settings.
Advantages of the shared adaptive sampling model
Viewing rule-following behavior as an application of the shared adaptive sampling model
offers several advantages. First, it is parsimonious. Other theories describe the independent
evolution of cooperation, or higher-order punishment, or conformity. Recognizing rule-following
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as one application of a more foundational cognitive mechanism allows us to acknowledge the
contributions of these theories without endorsing one over another. Further, this structure has
applications beyond just rule-following or decision-making; it describes the underpinnings of
moral reasoning, rationality, judgements of force, socialization, and modal thought more broadly
(Phillips & Cushman, 2017, Shtulman & Phillips, 2018; Rand et al., 2014).
Second, a shared adaptive sampling account of rule-following behavior allows for
cultural variation in cooperative tendencies. If cooperation were intrinsically rewarding, we
would expect to see universally high levels of cooperation; however, while it is widespread,
cooperation is far from uniform across cultures (Ensminger 2014; Henrich 2000). It would be
difficult to account for cross-cultural variation while arguing that humans consider cooperation
to be intrinsically valuable; however, variation across cultures can readily be accounted for by
the shared adaptive sampling model.
For example, a cross-cultural analysis of contributions in an ultimatum game — which
included subject groups from western cities, the Peruvian Amazon, Japan, and Indonesia —
found considerable variation in offerings. The sample group from a Peruvian tribe, the
Machiguenga, had a mean and modal offering of 25 percent and 15 percent of the total pay-off,
respectively; the Los Angeles sample group’s mean and modal offerings were 48 percent and 50
percent, respectively (Henrich, 2000). But the Machiguenga live in small societies of 300 people
and are largely self-sustaining at the family level. For them, it is not particularly common to
cooperate with or act generously towards non-family members, and at the time of the study, what
little experience they did have with non-kin cooperation was likely low-utility, due to the thenrecent rise in unwelcome, foreigner-driven development and market integration (Henrich 2000).
Thus, it is not likely that the possibility of issuing generous contributions would have appeared in
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the Machiguengas’ original consideration sets, and it is even less likely that the option issuing a
generous contribution would have been selected after more deliberate consideration.
Criticisms of the shared adaptive sampling model
In spite of the advantages offered by the shared-adaptive sampling account of rulefollowing behavior, critics may find its implication — that people follow rules just because
entertaining the possibility of violating them is computationally expensive — to be
counterintuitive, as it is inconsistent with people’s experience of reality. People tend to identify
with a “conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about
and what to do” — this is our more intentioned, explicit system of thought, which Kahneman
(2011) labels “System 2” (p. 21). However, it is the more automatic, intuitive system of thought
(“System 1”) that interprets our reality so that System 2 can operate with maximum efficiency.
The two-step process modeled by the shared-adaptive sampling mechanism dovetails nicely with
Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2. Formation of a consideration set through adaptive sampling
can be thought of as an operation of System 1, and explicit evaluation of the relative contextspecific merits of options generated can be thought of as an operation of System 2. Because the
intuitive System 1 systematically represents a normative and cohesive reality, it follows that rulefollowing behavior would be more easily identified as a possible course of action (Kahneman,
2011, p. 413, 424-6).
Importantly, the shared adaptive sampling model does not imply that weighting of value
and probability happens only at the intuitive level, nor does it require that the original
consideration set places permanent boundaries around the space of possibilities available for
more explicit evaluation. Situations can be considered and evaluated and reconsidered and
reevaluated in an iterative process. The shared adaptive sampling model just provides a means of
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structuring that process, in a way that lends itself to accounting for the pervasiveness of rulefollowing behaviors.
Shared adaptive sampling and normative behavior
If we are to view rule-following behavior through the lens of the shared adaptive
sampling model, the question becomes: At which stage of decision-making does the rule or norm
become relevant? There are two basic positions that one may take:
1. Normative actions are more readily identified as possible and are selected for in the first
stage of sampling, which occurs below conscious awareness.
2. Norms do not constrain intuitive possibility sampling and only become relevant in the
second stage of sampling, when people determine which possibility or action is most
appropriate or valuable in a given situation.
3. Moral norms constrain intuitive possibility sampling; other sorts of norms only become
relevant in the second stage of sampling. This is a soft version of the first position.
Research by Phillips & Cushman (2017) offers us reason to reject the second position:
They find that moral norms constrain intuitive assessments of possibility. Additionally, the
literature on cooperation, reciprocity, and pro-sociality give us reason to expect that the same
effect would be found for social norms. For these reasons, this article takes the first position.
Thesis Statement
If it is the case that actors conform to seemingly arbitrary rules in part because, on an
intuitive level, they do not reflexively entertain the possibility of flouting those rules, we would
expect that under time pressure, participants will judge all normative rule violations to be
impossible to a higher extent than they would if given time to reflect. This finding, if it is indeed
born out in the data, would offer evidence to further support a two-stage model of decision-
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making in which social norm-compliant behaviors are prioritized in intuitive considerations of
possible actions. It would also serve to further integrate current theories of justice, punishment,
and cooperation, which focus on the positive and negative incentive structures surrounding rulefollowing behavior.
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Study 1

The purpose of this study was to establish that participants’ evaluations of each action
item tracked with the a priori classification of those actions as abnormal, immoral, impossible, or
ordinary. Below are the results from the final stimulus set, which first underwent two rounds of
norming.
Participants
Fifty-one adult participants (Mage = 38, SDage = 13.02; 17 females; 23 post-secondary
degrees) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com).
Methods
In an online survey, participants read a series of eight scenarios, each consisting of a oneto two-sentence description of a commonplace situation. For example, one scenario read: “As
you enter a museum, the security guard informs you that you must leave your backpack at the
coat check.” Associated with each scenario was a list of 16 actions, coded as ordinary (“admire
your favorite painting”), impossible (“transform into a very large seal”), abnormal (“search your
backpack for a snack”), or immoral (“rip a painting into small pieces”).
Ordinary actions were those that would conventionally be considered typical in the
scenario at hand. Impossible actions were those that would violate the physical laws of space and
time. Abnormal actions were those that would violate a context-specific amoral rule or social
norm. Immoral actions were those that would be considered overtly wrong: for example,
stealing, killing, or destructive behaviors.
In total, there were eight scenarios and 128 actions, with 16 actions associated with each
scenario. In each scenario-specific grouping of actions, four were ordinary, four were impossible,
four were abnormal, and four were immoral. Subjects were asked to rate each of the 128 actions
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on a scale of 1 to 5, in terms of social acceptability or moral permissibility. For example, a
subject might be asked, “Is it socially acceptable for you to … rip a painting into small pieces?”
or “Is it morally permissible for you to … rip a painting into small pieces?” Subjects were
randomly assigned to the social acceptability condition or the moral permissibility condition. The
study was conducted using Testable.
Trials for which the response time was too fast, trials that timed out, and trials with not
applicable responses were excluded from the analyses. The final dataset consisted of 4716 trials,
with 2634 social acceptability ratings and 2082 moral permissibility ratings.
Results
A two-sample t-test confirmed the validity of the a priori classifications of actions as
ordinary, immoral, abnormal, or impossible. The abnormal events were regarded as socially
unacceptable (M = 4.41, SD = 1.023) more frequently than the ordinary events (M = 1.34, SD =
0.89), t(1488.8) = 62.98, p < .001. Abnormal events were also regarded as immoral (M = 3.77,
SD = 1.30), more frequently than the ordinary events (M = 1.20, SD = 0.69), t(853.15) = 42.51, p
< .001).
Immoral events were regarded as socially unacceptable (M = 4.82, SD = 0.64) more
frequently than both the abnormal events (M = 4.41, SD = 1.02), t(1252.6) = 9.241, p < .001, and
the ordinary events (M = 1.34, SD = 0.89), t(1448.6) = 89.52, p < .001. Immoral events were also
regarded as immoral (M = 4.88, SD = 0.49) more frequently than the abnormal events (M = 3.77,
SD = 1.30), t(721.8) = 19.41, p < .001, and the ordinary events (M = 1.20, SD = 0.69), t(1186) =
111.12, p < .001.
Finally, the immoral events were more immoral (M = 4.88, SD = 0.49) than they were
socially unacceptable (M = 4.82, SD = 0.64), (t(1435) = 2.10, p = .04), and the abnormal events
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were more socially unacceptable (M = 4.41, SD = 1.02) than they were immoral (M = 3.77, SD =
1.30), t(1070.8) = 9.85, p < .001. These general relationships are visible in Figure 2, which
presents the acceptability ratings and morality ratings for each Event Type.

Figure 2. Average rating across Event Types. A rating of 5 has a strong negative valence (not
at all morally permissible, not at all socially acceptable), while a rating of 1 has a strong positive
valence (very morally permissible, very socially acceptable). Ratings of 3 are in-between. The
bars reflect ratings’ standard error.
Study 2
The purpose of this study was to measure speeded and reflective judgements of
possibility for each action (Phillips & Cushman, 2017). Participants faced time constraints,
which was not the case in Study 1. The time pressure paradigm allows us to identify which
actions participants intuitively view as impossible. In the context of the shared adaptive sampling
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model, these actions are the possibilities that participants would reject early in the possibly
sampling process, perhaps without conscious awareness.
Participants
There were 186 participants (Mage = 36, SDage = 10.02; 70 females; 73 post-secondary
degrees) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com).
Methods
Subjects made judgements about the same 128 actions, labeling them either possible or
impossible by pressing the corresponding key on their keyboard. Each subject judged four
scenarios and their corresponding actions under time pressure (1.5 seconds) and judged the
remaining four scenarios and their corresponding actions with no time pressure. In the slow
trials, subjects were encouraged to reflect on their answers. The combination of scenarios
represented in each fast and slow group were randomized using a Latin-square design. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions created by this randomization scheme.
Trials for which the response time was too fast, trials that timed out, and trials with not
applicable responses were excluded. The final dataset consisted of 15,991 trials. There were
4157 abnormal trails, 4110 immoral trials, 3902 impossible trials, and 3822 ordinary trials,
divided across 10,268 fast trials and 5723 slow trials.
Results
A generalized linear mixed model was used to understand how subjects’ possibility
assessments were affected by Event Type (immoral, impossible, ordinary, or abnormal) and
Deliberation. The significance of an effect was computed by using an ANOVA to compare a
model that included the factor of interest to a model that did not include that factor but was
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otherwise identical. These models included random intercepts for both participants and
scenarios.
There was no significant main effect of Event Type (X2(3) = 6225.7, p < .001) or
Deliberation (X2(1) = 0.024, p = .876), though there was a significant interaction between
Deliberation and Event Type (X2(3) =204.58, p< .001). Figure 3 presents the spread of
impossibility ratings for each Event Type under the speeded and reflective conditions.
To further explore the relationship between Event Type and Deliberation, a series of
generalized linear mixed models were used to predict the effect of Deliberation on possibility
judgements for each Event Type in isolation. An ANOVA test revealed no significant main
effect of Deliberation for abnormal events (z = 0.495, p = .621), though it did reveal a significant
main effect of Deliberation for immoral events (z = -5.621, p < .001), impossible events (z =
10.82, p < .001), and ordinary events (z = -6.591, p < .001). Because judgements for impossible
events and ordinary events fall so close to the ends of the possibility spectrum, it is likely that
their respective interactions with Deliberation are attributable to a regression to the mean.
Finally, it is noteworthy that, even given time to reflect, the average impossibility rating
for abnormal events (M = .30, SD = .46) and immoral events (M = .40, SD = .49) was far above
the impossibility ratings for ordinary events (M = .04, SD = .19).
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Figure 3. Percent of events judged impossible. Figure 3 displays the spread of impossibility
ratings for each a priori Event Type, across fast and slow conditions. Fast judgements were made
under time pressure; slow judgements were not. The analysis was performed at the level of each
action (N = 128). The boxes reflect the upper and lower quartiles of trials’ average impossibility
ratings for each Event Type. The vertical lines represent the spread of the data beyond the middle
two quartiles, and the dots represent outliers.
For a more detailed view, see Figure 4, which regresses morality judgements against the
difference between fast and slow judgements of possibility for each Event Type. Because
impossible events were excluded from the dataset used to make this map, any y-axis value
greater than 0 reflects an increase in mistaken judgements of impossibility under time pressure,
whereas y-axis values less than 0 reflect an increase in correct judgements of possibility under
time pressure. Of the three categories, immoral events clearly have the steepest slope.
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Figure 4. Deliberation effect by Event Type. The y-axis of Figure 4 gives the difference
between fast and slow judgements of possibility. A point falling above y = 0 represents an action
that was judged to be impossible to a greater extent under time pressure than with deliberation.
Morality ratings are on the x-axis. A rating of 5 refers to not at all morally permissible, while a
rating of 1 refers to very morally permissible.
This sharp uptick in impossibility judgements is also visible in Figure 5, which does not
differentiate between a priori Event Types. Instead, Figure 5 features just two linear regressions:
one for events that had a morality judgement less than 4.5, and one for events that had a morality
judgement of greater than 4.5. This is a somewhat arbitrary number, lying halfway in between 4
(somewhat not morally permissible) and 5 (not at all morally permissible). It was chosen because
it reflects a value that might be analogous to “not morally permissible” and because it cleanly
partitioned the data into one linear regression that is largely flat and one linear regression that is
sharply sloped. Thus, it is clear that at the higher end of the immorality spectrum, the gap
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between fast and slow assessments of actions’ possibility widens even when the priori
classifications of those actions are not taken into account.

Figure 5. Deliberation Effect Across Morality Ratings. The y-axis of Figure 5 gives the
difference between fast and slow judgements of possibility. A point falling above y = 0
represents an action that was judged to be impossible to a greater extent under time pressure than
with deliberation. A rating of 5 refers to not at all morally permissible, while a rating of 1 refers
to very morally permissible. The figure presents two linear regressions: one for events that had a
morality judgement less than 4.5, and one for events that had a morality judgement of greater
than 4.5.
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Study 3

The purpose of this study was to measure context-independent judgements of the value
and probability of each action. These ratings reflect the cached value of each actions, as
described by the shared adaptive sampling model.
Participants
There were 62 participants (Mage = 33, SDage = 12.42; 19 females; 13 post-secondary
degrees) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com).
Methods
Subjects rated each of the 128 actions on a scale of 1 to 5, in terms of value or
probability. For example, a subject might be asked, “Is it good or bad for you to … rip a painting
into small pieces?” or “How likely is it that you … rip a painting into small pieces?” For both
conditions, actions were presented without context. This is at difference with the prior two
studies, in which subjects read a blurb about the context in which they would hypothetically
perform the proposed actions.
Subjects were randomly assigned to the value condition or the probability condition.
Trials for which the response time was too fast, trials that timed out, and trials with not
applicable responses were all excluded. Trial 97 was also excluded from all analyses, due to
experimenter error. The final dataset consisted of 6704 trials, with 3444 for the value condition
and 3260 for the probability condition.
Results
Colinearity of Judgements.
It proved difficult to pull apart assessments of general value (study 3), general probability
(study 3), situation-specific acceptability (study 1), and situation-specific morality (study 1), as
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the four are largely co-linear. Each bar in Figure 6 represents an action (N = 127), presented in
ascending order according to the average of all four judgements for each action. There is
variation across judgements, but on the whole, they trend in the same direction at a similar rate.
Actions that were less valuable were deemed less moral, less acceptable, and less likely.

Figure 6. Colinearity of judgements. Each bar represents an action (N = 127), presented in
ascending order according to the average of all four judgements for each action. A rating of 5
carries a negative valence (not at all morally permissible, not at all socially acceptable), while a
rating of 1 carries a positive valence (very morally permissible, very socially acceptable).
Probability and value by Event Type
Figure 7 displays the value and probability ratings of each action, coded by Event Type.
In order to aid visibility, the scatterplot is divided into 9 sections, reflecting various levels of
value and likelihood. The ordinary events are clustered around the “good and likely” section,
whereas the immoral events are entirely “bad and unlikely.” The impossible events are almost all
“unlikely,” though they cover the range of values pretty evenly. Abnormal events are the only
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ones that are scattered throughout the plot. The sections surrounding “bad and likely” are
noticeable empty. This figure clarifies the relationship between value, probability, acceptability,
and morality as they relate to the a priori Event Types.

Figure 7. Event value and probability. Figure 7 displays the value and probability of each
action, coded by Event Type. In order to aid visibility, the scatterplot is divided into 9 sections
reflection various levels of value and likelihood.
Deliberation and value.
The deliberation data, the two situation-specific judgements, and the two general
judgements were combined for a final round of modeling. In these analyses, impossible events
were excluded, narrowing the scope of the analysis to focus on the mistake participants made in
judging unacceptable or impermissible, yet possible, events to be impossible.
Deliberation effect for possible events. A linear mixed effect model was used to predict
the difference between fast and slow responses from the variables value, probability,
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acceptability, and morality. The data was analyzed at the level of the 95 possible actions, and the
model included a random intercept for the 8 scenarios. The significance of an effect was
computed by using an ANOVA to compare a model that included the factor of interest to a
model that did not include that factor but was otherwise identical.
There was a significant main effect of value (X2(1) = 6.58; p = .01), such that actions with
a higher value rating (more negative valence) were judged to be impossible to a greater extent
under time pressure. There was also a main effect of acceptability (X2(1) = 10.91; p < .001), but
in the opposite direction: actions with a higher acceptability rating (more negative valence) were
judged to be impossible to a lesser extent under time pressure. There was no main effect for
probability (X2(1) = 0.3226; p=.5701) or morality (X2(1) =3.1604; p = .07545). The effect of
value is in the positive direction, whereas the effect of acceptability is in the negative direction;
thus, under this model, value drives the positive Deliberation interaction while acceptability
judgements act as a moderating force in order to accommodate the difference in fast and slow
possibility judgements between acceptable/good events (ordinary) and somewhat
unacceptable/bad events (abnormal).
Ordinary events (MAcceptability = 1.34, SDAcceptability = 0.89) were judged to be impossible to
a greater extent under time pressure, t(47.62) = 5.29, p < .001, while abnormal events
(MAcceptability = 4.41, SDAcceptability = 1.02) were not, t(61.30) = 0.16, p = .88. The deliberation
effect in ordinary events is attributable to a regression to the mean; the lack of a deliberation
effect in abnormal events is attributable to their middling value ratings (see Figure 8).
Acceptability ratings function as a moderating force due to the disconnect between perceptions
of acceptability and value for abnormal events (see Figures 8).
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Figure 8. Acceptability and value judgements. Each bar represents an action (N = 95),
presented in ascending order according to the average of all four judgements for each action. A
rating of 5 carries a negative valence (very bad, not at all socially acceptable), while a rating of 1
carries a positive valence (very good, very socially acceptable).
Drivers of the deliberation effect. Among events for which there was a deliberation
effect, which variables predict differences in fast and slow judgements of possibility? A linear
mixed effects model was used to predict the difference between fast and slow possibility ratings
from the variables value, probability, acceptability, and morality, considering only possible
events for which there were a deliberation effect (N = 75). The model included a random
intercept for the 8 scenarios.
The significance of an effect was computed by using an ANOVA to compare a model
that included the factor of interest to a model that did not include that factor but was otherwise
identical. There was a main effect for value (X2(1) = 4.03; p=.04), such that actions with a higher
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value rating (more negative valence) were judged to be impossible to a greater extent under time
pressure. There was no main effect for probability (X2(1) = 0.07; p = .79), morality (X2(1) = 0.08;
p = .7741), or acceptability (X2(1) = 0.01; p =.94).
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Discussion

The three studies above use the shared adaptive sampling model as a framework for
considering how social norms interact with the decision-making process, hypothesizing that they,
like moral norms, would constrain intuitive assessments of possibility. Had this finding been
born out in the data, it would have provided evidence to suggest that we follow rules and social
norms because the possibility of violating them does not occur to us. However, at difference with
this prediction, abnormal actions — those which violate general social norms, like crab-walking
in a public space — were the only actions to produce no significant difference between speeded
and reflective judgements of possibility (see Figure 2). To better understand the disconnect
between the hypothesis and the results, this article now turns to a deeper exploration of the
shared adaptive sampling model and of moral and social norms.
Shared adaptive sampling and cached value
To review, the shared adaptive sampling model holds that decision-making occurs via a
two-step, iterative process. In the first step, the mind subconsciously forms a consideration set,
informed by the historic value and probability of non-actual possibilities. In the second step, the
mind reasons over those possibilities more explicitly, dismissing those that would not be
situationally appropriate or possible (Phillips, Morris, & Cushman, 2019).
Under the shared adaptive sampling model, we would expect to see that actions that were
considered bad and unlikely would produce a larger deliberation effect, even when presented
without context. With this in mind, in Study 3 subjects were asked to make context-free
judgements of the probability and value of the 128 actions proposed in the first two studies.
These assessments reflect the general cached probability (from very likely to very unlikely) and
general cached value (from very good to very bad) of each action.

WHY DO WE FOLLOW RULES?

32

Though broadly speaking, worse events were judged to be impossible to a greater extent
under time pressure, this effect is specifically traceable to the context-free value of those events,
which interacted with deliberation above and beyond other judgements’ interactions. That value
was a strong and singular predictor of the deliberation effect provides new evidence to suggest
that, consistent with the shared adaptive sampling model, context-general value plays a key role
early in the possibility sampling process.
The same effect was not found for probability; this is at odds with past theoretical and
empirical work on possibility sampling (Kahneman, 2011; Lieder, Hsu, & Griffiths, 2014;
Phillips, Morris, & Cushman, 2019; Bear et al., 2020). However, this finding, or lack thereof,
should be taken with a grain of salt, as the time pressure paradigm used to measure intuitive
judgements of possibility (Phillips & Cushman, 2017) successfully identifies the possibilities that
participants’ minds instinctively reject but fails to replicate the process of possibility generation.
Because possibility generation must necessarily occur before pruning, the time pressure
paradigm falls short of fully capturing the first stage of decision-making, as described in the
shared adaptive sampling.
It may be the case that probability is particularly relevant during the initial, pre-pruning
round of possibility generation. This would be consistent with the availability heuristic, a
“mental shortcut” through which exposure and ease of access influence assessments of
probability or likelihood (Kahneman, 2011; Lieder, Hsu, & Griffiths, 2014). It would also be
consistent with research on spontaneous generation of possibilities (Bear et al, 2020). Without
further research, though, it is difficult to make any definitive claims.
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Situation-specific unacceptability
Determining the general cached value for each action is helpful in that it provides some
structure to the results obtained in the previous two studies. We would not expect to see a
deliberation effect for actions that are generally acceptable but situationally maladaptive, as was
the case for many of the abnormal actions. Indeed, abnormal events were consistently judged to
be more specifically unacceptable than generally bad (t(87.39) = 11.72, p < .001). The variability
in the context-free value and probability of abnormal events (see Figure 7) provides context for
the lack of a clear deliberation effect for these events. On the whole, immoral events are also
more specifically-unacceptable than they are generally-bad (t(111.26) = 9.90, p < .001), though
to a significantly lesser degree than is the case with the abnormal events (t(65.95) = -10.62, p <
.001).
Moral norms vs. social norms. This is consistent with the argument that moral norms
are different from social norms in that they hold more weight across contexts. As a class, norms
involve “a right to expect and demand” certain things of group members (Brennan et al., 2013).
The key difference between moral norms and social norms is the audience to which each applies.
Regardless of whether you believe in a universal moral code, those who subscribe to moral
norms generally consider them to apply to the human species as a whole (Brennan et al., 2013).
They are treated as universal and non-arbitrary (Brennan et al., 2013; Lewis, 1969). Moral norm
violations are generally bad as well as specifically unacceptable. For example, skinning a cat for
personal enjoyment is bad (Value = 4.73), regardless of whether or not you do it during your
professor’s lecture (Acceptability = 4.89).
Social norms, on the other hand, may only apply to a certain group and in certain
situations (Brennan et al., 2013). While moral norms hold weight across contexts, social norms
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require context: certain actions may be inappropriate in certain settings but fine in other settings.
For example, it is generally good to play boardgames (Value = 1.54), but it is far from socially
acceptable to play a boardgame during your professor’s lecture (Acceptability = 4.68).
Comparing the relative morality of abnormal and immoral events, we see that immoral
events were almost universally considered to be more immoral than abnormal events (see Figure
4). Further, abnormal events fall within the range of morality judgements for which fast and slow
possibility judgements were largely similar; however, immoral events, which fall at the higher
end of the moral impermissibility spectrum, saw a sharp increase in reflective impossibility
judgements (See Figures 4 and 5). Perhaps more personally salient social norm violations would
have been capable of producing a deliberation effect: future research should explore this
possibility. But regardless of whether or not that is the case, the data suggest a clear division
between moral and social norms.
Normativity and what’s worth considering
Deliberative norms vs. practice-based norms
Brennan et al. (2013) distinguish between deliberative norms and practice-based norms.
Deliberative norms govern the acceptability of certain thoughts, whereas practice-based norms
govern the acceptability of certain behaviors. Building a bonfire in your office breakroom (Value
= 4.6, Probability = 4.92) or hiding a dead body in a public library’s bathroom (Value = 4.67,
Probability = 4.7) are also not options that many would act on.
The difference, however, is that you might be less likely to admit to seriously entertaining
the latter two possibilities (Brennan et al., 2013). There’s a sense in which it feels inappropriate
to even consider burning down your office or murdering someone and then placing the evidence
in a building filled with children. These actions violate engrained values about respect for others’
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property and wellbeing. They also feel less arbitrary and more inherently wrong, unlike crabwalking, which is a harmless activity. One could conceive of a possible world in which walking
around on four legs is the normal, even respectful, thing to do. In this world, we walk on two
legs. Public buildings would be chaotic and possibly dangerous places with some people crabwalking and others travelling bipedally. Our walking norms are not entirely arbitrary (walking on
two legs is faster), but they don’t restrict our imagination in the same way that norms against
bodily harm do.
Deliberative norms and morality
As they are more engrained, and more universal, we might expect moral norms to
constrain thought in addition to constraining practice. This is not to suggest that moral and
deliberative norms are one in the same. Rather, moral norms may be a subset of deliberative
norms. Particularly potent social norms — for example, social norms governing the operation of
a group that is central to one’s social identity — may also function as deliberative norms,
constraining thought in addition to constraining action (Brennan et al., 2013). Less potent social
norms may become relevant later in the deliberation process; these may include the generallygood, situationally-unacceptable norms discussed earlier.
Consider Figure 9, which displays a ceiling effect wherein people consistently report that
it would be very unlikely that they would do things falling above a certain “bad” value. The
vertical line here is drawn at 3.75, after which the linear regression becomes nearly flat. Thus,
actions falling below a certain value (3.75 out of 5, slightly better than somewhat bad) were
almost uniformly judged as unlikely; people were not willing to consider that it would be
“likely” that they do something that is generally “bad.” Some of the abnormal events were
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judged to be just as “bad” as were the immoral events, and the ceiling (above 3.75) consists of
both immoral and abnormal events.

Figure 9. Probability and value of immoral and abnormal events. The points in Figure 9
represent immoral and abnormal actions. The x-axis reflects value ratings, and the y-axis reflects
probability ratings. A rating of 5 refers to very bad or very unlikely, while a rating of 1 refers to
very good or very unlikely. The figure presents two linear regressions: one for one for events that
had a value judgement less than 3.75, and one for events that had a value judgement of greater
than 3.75.
Tying it together: Deliberation, norms, and the shared adaptive sampling model
Having explored all the above, we can now return to the original research question.
Previously, we considered two main positions on normative behavior and the shared adaptive
sampling model: (1) that social norms, like moral norms, constrain possibility sampling in the
first, intuitive stage of decision-making and (2) that social norms constrain possibility sampling
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in the second, deliberative stage of decision-making. The results from these three studies
replicated the morality effect reported by Phillips & Cushman (2017) but failed to extend this
finding to social norm violations.
However, to say that decision-making is a clean, two-step process, and that the time
pressure paradigm accurately assesses judgements made in the first step of that process, may be
misleading. Intuitive judgements of pre-written actions are hardly comparable to possibilities
generated internally. It may be more appropriate to model the initial stage of possibility sampling
— the formation of the initial consideration set — as a two-part process: first possibility
generation, then instinctive pruning. Both processes may be informed by historic value and
probability, and both may occur below conscious awareness.
And, if possibility sampling is an iterative process, deliberative norms likely come into
play in the earlier rounds of sampling, “removing some alternatives from the agenda of available
options” in the initial round of intuitive, context-free pruning (Brennan et al., 2013, p. 251). A
practice-based norm, however, might not become relevant until later in the decision-making
process, when contextual factors like environment, actors, and mood are considered. Thus, when
it comes to the shared adaptive sampling model, the more relevant distinction may be between
deliberative and practice-based norms, rather than moral and social norms. In this way, we can
understand deliberative norms as those norms which constrain thought in the first stage of
possibility sampling (intuitive pruning of the original consideration set) and practice-based
norms as those norms which constrain thought in the second stage of possibility sampling (the
explicit deliberation of the consideration set).
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As a class, the abnormal actions used in this study were not sufficiently “bad” or salient
to qualify as violations of deliberative norms; thus, they did not receive higher impossibility
ratings under time pressure.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
Population Studied
In the case of this study, a diverse sample, drawn from across education backgrounds,
genders, and geographies, may have been a barrier rather than a boon. Social norms are highly
specific to certain groups of people (Brennan et al., 2013; Lewis, 1969). It would have been more
appropriate to study the effects of norms on decision-making for a narrowly defined social
group, like a college campus or a workplace. It is difficult to convey the social meaning of
certain actions via an online survey that, by design, must be broadly interpretable to a wide range
of participants. The need for interpretability limited the sorts of social norms that could be
included in the survey; narrowing the population studied would have made it possible to target
more specific and salient social norms.
Motivations for Conforming to Norms
This study offers little insight into the reasons why participants issued the judgements
they did. Did they view certain actions as unacceptable because they were intrinsically wrong,
because they would feel guilty for doing them, or because they feared backlash from others?
Research suggests that social punishment and social expectations are critical in enforcing norms;
this study does not involve either (Declerck et al. 2013; Baumard et al. 2013; Rand et al., 2014;
Brennan et al., 2013; Lewis, 1969; Gürerk et al., 2006; Tomasello, 2019).
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First-Person Questionnaire
A key limitation of the study is that its subject is social norms, yet its questions do not at
all involve judgements about other people: all questions were asked in the first-person (ie, how
good or bad would it be for you to …). First, this is problematic because we are often not faithful
judges of ourselves. People tend to overestimate the degree to which they personally comply
with positive social and moral norms (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Tappin & McKay, 2016). Future
research might compare these first-person judgements with similar third-person judgements, to
measure and control for any sort of self-serving bias, particularly with regard to judgements of
probability. Second, first-person judgements isolate the participant from considerations of social
accountability. Some research suggests that some degree of observation is required for people to
act on social norms (Brennan et al., 2013).
Possibility Generation
The time pressure paradigm measures what possibilities people are quick to rule out —
perhaps reflecting the first round of revisions in the adaptive sampling process — but it doesn’t
measure what initially comes to mind. It is possible that at this stage, probability becomes more
relevant, as we would more readily generate or conceptualize a possible action that we have
frequently encountered in the past.
Future Research
Future empirical research on intuition and empirical norms might focus on a specific
demographic group, beginning with an ethnographic study of the group’s normative behaviors
and then following up with a survey similar to the one used in this study, using understanding
gained in the ethnography to inform the content of the survey. Alternatively, future research
could use a time pressure paradigm with possible actions that violate norms or social
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expectations that apply specifically to a certain group but not others, focusing, for example, on
gender norms or religious practices.
In order to better understand people’s motivations for conforming to norms, researchers
might ask ‘how mad would people be if you …’ rather than ‘how socially acceptable is it for you
to …’ This would focus attention on the social consequences of norm violations. An alternative
approach — one that would avoid the potential confound of any self-flattering biases — would
be to ask participants to make social judgements about third parties by presenting actions in the
third person. Finally, future research might present participants with a scenario, ask them to
quickly list a series of possible actions they might take in that scenario, and then ask them to
revisit and edit that list. This approach would better capture the process of possibility generation.
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Conclusion

When making intuitive judgements of possibility, participants regarded immoral actions
as impossible; the same effect was absent in evaluations of actions that are simply abnormal,
violating social norms rather than moral norms. However, assessments of moral permissibility
are ultimately not responsible for this effect; the general perceived value (good vs. bad) of
proposed actions is what best predicts increased error in speeded vs. reflective judgements of
possibility. This is consistent with a two-staged decision-making process, as described in the
shared adaptive sampling model, in which the mind samples generally good and generally likely
possibilities before giving greater consideration to contextually appropriate possibilities. Future
research, however, should explore possibility generation, an underexplored prerequisite step to
the first stage of intuitive possibility sampling.
Overall, these studies elucidate the similarities and differences between various
normative judgements (moral permissibility, social acceptability) and general assessments of
value and probability, corroborating the shared adaptive sampling model, providing reason to
believe that moral norms are wholly distinct from social norms, and offering insight into how
deliberative and practice-based norms may interact with possibility sampling and decisionmaking.
Different norms operate at different levels of the possibility sampling process: Some may
govern what we do when others are watching, some govern what we are willing to consider, and
some may constrain possibilities that comfortably come to mind, without governing our thoughts
or actions. The time pressure paradigm used in this project is best suited to study the sorts of
norms that determine which possibilities are appropriate to seriously entertain, with nearuniversal relevance. Future research may consider norms affecting possibility generation, group-
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specific social norms as identified through ethnographic research, or practice-based norms
enforced by social punishment.
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